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 As the world becomes increasingly connected and the number of users grows 
exponentially and “things” go online, the prospect of cyberspace becoming a 
significant target for cybercriminals is a reality. Any host or device that is 
exposed on the internet is a prime target for cyberattacks. A denial-of-service 
(DoS) attack is accountable for the majority of these cyberattacks. Although 
various solutions have been proposed by researchers to mitigate this issue, 
cybercriminals always adapt their attack approach to circumvent 
countermeasures. One of the modified DoS attacks is known as distributed 
reflection denial-of-service attack (DRDoS). This type of attack is considered 
to be a more severe variant of the DoS attack and can be conducted in 
transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP). 
However, this attack is not effective in the TCP protocol due to the three-way 
handshake approach that prevents this type of attack from passing through 
the network layer to the upper layers in the network stack. On the other hand, 
UDP is a connectionless protocol, so most of these DRDoS attacks pass 
through UDP. This study aims to examine and identify the differences 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The phenomenal growth of internet use over the past decade illustrates the increasing social 
importance of the internet. This growth proves that the internet is not only a valuable tool for researchers but 
also a major part of the infrastructure of global society. This growth can be attributed to changes in 
traditional roles for doing the business by using the internet, which allows all transactions conducted on the 
internet. The government uses the internet to provide its citizens and the world at large with information and 
governmental services. The internet enables companies to share and exchange information among their 
divisions, suppliers, partners, and customers to increase operational efficiency [1]. Research and educational 
institutions depend on the internet as a medium for collaboration to enhance their research discoveries. 
If we consider the previous years, specifically 1995, when the internet was used by the global 
population and analyze the growth curve until 2020 [2], we find that the percentage jumps dramatically in 
Figure 1. Amid this increase in the number of internet users [3], security challenges have started to grow [4] 
and internet penetration has increased in the 2009–2018 period at 24%-51%. The service provider wants to 
offer services to customers in the best and most secure ways. Thus, they take care of the field to provide 
secure services by addressing vulnerabilities on the service side. However, this task is nearly impossible to 
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achieve because of the difficulty of controlling the network resources [5]; then, they go ahead to another way 
represented in the security companies but this also needs some time to update their [6]. 
Unfortunately, with the growing dependence of business on the internet, security problems have 
begun to pose major obstacles to the future development of the internet. With increasing Internet use, the 
number of attacks on the internet has also increased rapidly. The internet is particularly vulnerable to attacks 
because of its public nature and because it has no centralised control. Therefore, network attacks have 
become more sophisticated because the attackers have shifted from physical (direct sabotage of digital 
resources) to remote (disruption or disabling of one or more targets) methods.  
DDoS attacks are observed as the most devastating and prevalent in the current era, regardless of 
whether one has resources in the cloud environment or not. DDoS attacks alone have caused extensive 
damage to various businesses worldwide; among the major affected targets were Sony PlayStation Network, 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Zorz, Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal. According to DDoS security vendor 
Prolexic, DDoS attack incidents reported in 2019 were more than the total number of attacks reported in 
2018. Arbor Worldwide Infrastructure reported DDoS as a top security threat on the cloud [7], and the 










Figure 2. DDoS attack trends in 10 years 
 
 
The major security companies are monitoring the digital world to analyze the threats on internet 
users and protect them from possible violations. Thus, every year, quarterly reports analyze and evaluate the 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
Distributed reflection denial of service attack: A critical review (Riyadh Rahef Nuiaa) 
5329 
risk on network resources and propose possible solutions to minimize or reduce losses of the assets. Each 
report is represented as Q with numbers from 1 to 4 depending on its sequence in the report.  
Paper organization: The remaining sections of this paper are as follows: Section 2 explains a brief 
history of DDoS Attacks and show last trends in 10 Years for the attacks, brief display for a mechanism of 
DRDoS attack then Classifying these attacks are presented in section 3 and 4 respectively, The conclusion of 
the work is shown in section 5. 
 
 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DDOS ATTACKS 
DoS attacks date back to the late 1980s. Launching such attacks requires technical skills and 
performed using powerful computer resources. In the early 1990s, DoS attacks were performed using 
automated tools by compromising the computing resources of a vulnerable machine. Using such tools has 
facilitated attacks on any target. Consequently, this condition has led to an increase in DoS attacks by the 
early 2000 when businesses moved to embrace the internet, and the websites of countless companies, 
including Microsoft and Amazon, witnessed distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS attacks 
utilize more than one machine to launch DoS attacks in a coordinated manner. 
DDoS attacks are often performed using automated tools that are transformed into launching attacks 
through malware (Trojan or worms) that carry DoS payloads. Once a computer is compromised by malware, 
the infected machine initiates an attack on the defined target at a specific time. When multiple infected 
machines attack the target, the magnitude of attack increases considerably [8], [9].  
Recent DDoS attacks appear to have more control over the compromised machines. Instead of 
infecting the machine with malware that performs a specific task, a new generation of malware has been 
developed in the form of backdoors or bots. Bots allow attackers to have complete control over computers 
and can issue commands to infected systems to coordinate and launch DDoS attacks [10]-[12]. A group of 
infected machines are usually networked together to muster strength in launching attacks. Such a network of 
infected machines of bots is called a botnet. Since the mid-2000s, DDoS attacks originating from botnets 
have grown in magnitude and effectiveness as attackers start using redefined techniques to take control of 
computers to initiate more effective and powerful attacks as shown in Figure 3. Since then, botnets have 





Figure 3. DDoS attack scenario 
 
 
DDoS attacks aim to interrupt the supply of services by crippling network and storage capacity of 
the authorized users [13]-[15]. The main challenge in network security is how to ensure safety from the 
attacks; moreover, several types of attacks prevent legitimate users from using the services provided to them, 
and these types of attacks are called DDoS. The attackers update their methods to intensify the damaging 
effect of their actions on the victim side. Several years ago, the attackers produced an upgraded version of the 
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DDoS attack with huge destructive power and a new attack mechanism; this type is called distributed 
reflection denial-of-service (DRDoS) attack. The traditional defense techniques are helpless in a standoff 
against these types of attacks. Researchers have proposed several new methods to detect or mitigate the 
attacks. These techniques are produced based on several factors such as number of hosts in the network, 
architecture and speed of the network, and others. Each method has advantages and disadvantages. Some 
organizations or companies want to install defense methods but others may want to install it on the network 
side to minimize costs. Data traffic consists of two types, namely, packet or flow traffic. Thus, the data traffic 
and its features can influence the creation of the defense method. The defense method based on packet traffic 
is used in low-speed networks and focuses on one or more of these features: packet filter, packet similarity, 
packet size, packet per unit time, response packet size, and others. The method based on flow traffic is 
appropriate for transmitting a large amount of traffic through a high-speed network. 
 
 
3. MECHANISM OF DRDOS ATTACK 
The DRDoS attack differs from its predecessor, the DDoS attack, because it extends the DDoS 
attack by including IP spoofing while making the attack complex. This condition renders existing DDoS 
attack detection and mitigation techniques ineffective against DRDoS attacks. The distributed reflection DoS 
attack consists of two phases: first is IP spoofing to hide attackers by using the reflector and second is 
amplification used to maximize the size of responses relative to the request size [16]-[18]. The main feature 
of the DRDoS attack, which makes this type different from the DDoS attack, is that it does not assault the 
destination directly but rather sends demand packets through a go-between, an exploitable “reflector” that 
also involves spoofing the sender’s IP address [19]. 
As Figure 4 shows the mechanism of amplification attack according to the following steps: the first 
step is the IP spoofing by the attacker by sending bots to broadcast spoofed demand packets that specify 
destination addresses as the prey address to the reflectors. Then, the reflectors respond to the demand with 
response packets and in a normal way send them to the prey. As an outcome, the prey is crushed by reflected 





Figure 4. An illustration of the amplification attack 
 
 
To make the attack strong and difficult to detect for that purpose the attacker be using the IP 
spoofing not only to hide identity but for the reason mention [21], in the beginning, this point and these 
techniques are employed in the DRDoS attack with the reflector which makes it distinct from the rest types 
attacks. 
 The first part is the reflector, a legal host or hosts used by the attacker to flood the prey network or web 
server by generating slaves spoofing the prey address [22], [23]. 
 The second part is the amplifier (amplification), a third party used to increase the volume of traffic 
reflected by the victim considerably [24]. Amplification attacks cause serious challenges to network 
security because of their privacy and amplification characteristics [20]. 
The scale of the answer packet in some protocols is larger than that of a message packet. By abusing 
this function, attackers may generate a large volume of traffic [25] from a relatively small traffic volume. 
Abused servers are called amplifiers from this function [26]. 
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4. CLASSIFICATION OF DRDOS ATTACKS 
The DRDoS attacks can be classified into two kinds depending on the transport layer that we have 
used, as shown in Figure 5. Attacking nodes create several requests in which the IP address of the source is 
replaced by the IP address of the host being targeted. Such requests are sent to servers or other tools that can 
be used to represent network traffic. The responses to these questions are sent to the target node. The traffic 
reflection process increases the difficulty of finding the true source of the attack [27]. 
This study on the DRDoS attack based on the TCP protocol is found in the SYN and BGP, whereas 
the DRDoS attack based on UDP [28] protocol is found in DNS, NTP, SNMP, and SSDP. The DRDoS attack 
preferred the UDP on TCP because the three-way handshake method is used in the TCP/IP to check if the 
legality of the traffic is confirmed using a three-way handshake such that the amplification is not possible. 
The packet size is not amplified to the large size in the DRDoS attack because this type of attack cannot pass 
through the TCP/IP protocol. If it passes through this protocol, then the effect is minimal compared with the 
effect of this attack if amplification occurs. As shown in Figure 6, the most common DRDoS attack classes 
are shown by both the TCP and UDP protocols. 
Increasingly rampant DDoS attacks, particularly attacks by DRDoS with UDPs, have become a 
global problem [29], [30]. DRDoS attacks, which focus on UDP reflection and amplification, can produce 
hundreds of gigabits per second of attack traffic, and has become a major threat to internet safety [31]. These 
attacks violate UDP-based network protocols that send a higher response compared with the request size. 
Many studies have also shown that UDP-based bandwidth amplification of DRDoS attacks can expand traffic 





Figure 5. DRDoS attack classification 
 
Figure 6. DRDoS attack in both TCP/UDP 
 
 
4.1.  DRDoS attacks based on TCP protocol 
Many researchers have worked to improve the border gateway protocol (BGP) and enhance it by 
using various techniques to detect or mitigate attacks, especially DRDoS attacks. Thus, in our research area, 
we aim to shed light on the techniques used to detect and mitigate the BGP protocol by DRDoS attack. TCP-
based DRDoS attacks were studied, but they only occur during the link establishment step due to the three-
way handshake procedure and have no major amplification impact [31]. The protocols based on TCP, such as 
FTP and Telnet, have the highest number of amplifiers, as shown by data from scanning a random IP address 
for the popular protocols [34]. In Table 1, the authors review the strengths and weaknesses of each research 
paper discussed as well as the methods that were used. 
Li et al. [35] the new kind of HTTP amplification assault is called Range-based Amplification 
assault. Two types of range-based amplification (RangeAmp) assaults are presented in this study, which 
enables attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities of Range implementation and harm CDNs' DDoS security 
mechanisms. Specifically, small byte range (SBR) and overlapping byte range (OBR) attacks are included in 
the RangeAmp attacks. In this type of attack not only the outgoing bandwidth of the origin servers deployed 
behind CDNs, but also the bandwidth of CDN proxy nodes can be massively depleted by attackers. The 
mitigation mechanism consists of three sides: server-side, CDN-side, and protocol-side. At the  
server-side, a local DOS defense is enforced. Requests for attacks are no different from harmless requests and 
come from CDN nodes that are widely spread. It is difficult for the source server to effectively protect 
against it without disrupting normal services. In the CDN-side, modify particular implementation on requests 
for range.  Based on the characteristics of RangeAmp attacks, CDNs can detect and intercept malicious range 
requests but the important approach is to enhance the Range header handling policy. The SBR attack is 
triggered by the deletion policy and expansion policy. The Laziness strategy can therefore be followed by 
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CDNs to fully protect against the SBR attack. But this also makes it difficult for CDNs to benefit from 
spectrum demands. A safer approach is to follow the strategy of extension, but not to expand the range of 
bytes too far. At the protocol-side: A Revise an RFC that is well-defined and security-aware. RangeAmp 
risks are basically caused by vague definitions and inadequate security considerations of the specifications. 
On the mailing list of the HTTP working group, we will continue to address this threat. We believe that in a 
future updated RFC, particularly for the HTTP middle-boxes, a more precise limit of the Range header 
should be specified CDNs, like. 
Miller and Pelsser [36] try to classify the attack that happened in BGP by using the Nlacholing 
technique in the BGP to mitigate DDoS attacks. The autonomous system (AS) is the part in which the 
internet consists of single or multiple networks controlled by one entity. However, BGP is a routing protocol 
with less authentication on the path source and checks the validity of the paths. The ASes can declare illegal 
paths for pseudo they do not have, pull part of the traffic to these prefixes or all.  
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Backes et al. [37] proposed a solution based on the idea that the assailant cannot guess or juggle the 
number of leaps between the amplifier and victim. Hop-count filtering (HCF) technique is used to analyze 
the time-to-live (TTL) of entering packets. The authors investigated the assumption that the attacker does not 
discover the valid TTL value. By using a mixture of BGP data and trace routing, we construct analytical 
models that perform checks and evaluates the TTL within a threshold value. The drawback of the technique 
is that the assailant uses a mixture of BGP and trace routing data to construct analytical models in the 
threshold TTL value for the victim. 
Lu et al [38] proposed a new mechanism that focuses on the reflection of SYN/ACK based on TCP 
protocol. This mechanism can detect the evil twin attack (ETA) in WLANs. The proposed mechanism 
consists of three stages: target access point (AP) set selection, reflection component, and judgment 
component. The first stage includes the search for the APs, and then selecting two or more that have an 
identical SSID; these select points are the entrance to the next stage. The second stage is the most important 
and is the core of the new mechanism to regulate the structural link between objective APs by using the TCP 
handshake through the demand–reply reflection of SYN/ACK packets. To start our mechanism, two co-op 
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WNICs on the client side are used to individually begin the TCP handshake and observe the obscurity of the 
predictable SYN/ACK packets in both directions. The result of this observation is the input to the next stage 
to execute the closing ETA confirmation. This mechanism is called bi-directional SYN reflection because it 
employs the reflection in the second stage. The last stage is responsible for deciding the presence of an ETA 
and distinguishes diverse ETA models depending on an outcome of bi-directional SYN reflection achieved 
by the second stage. The network environment can be classified by this stage into three states: a safe network, 
an unsafe network with series ETA, and an unsafe network with parallel ETA. 
 
4.2.  DRDoS based on UDP protocol 
 An attacker who plans to launch attacks such as a DRDoS attack exploits the UDP protocol to 
perform their attack because of UDP properties, which sometimes enable the abuse of vulnerabilities in the 
protocols. The DRDoS attackers exploit the policy and rules of UDP communication, especially those that 
belong to the increased size of the response for the request, and maybe a DRDoS attack that is employed to 
drive through these points and start their attack [16]. In Table 2, the authors review the strengths and 
weaknesses of each research paper discussed as well as the methods that were used. 
The UDP provides many services through several protocols based on UDP as a transport protocol, 
and the policy does not verify the IP addresses of sources when responding to any request; thus, many 
servers, which are called “reflectors” due to their functionality, will be abused [26]. The UDP protocol allows 
the amplification/reflection of the response that will lead to producing hundreds or thousands of gigabits per 
second of attack traffic. Thus, the DRDoS attacks become an influential threat to internet security [31]. The 
huge UDP traffic is amplified by the attacker, and the attacker is directed to the target by flooding the 
bandwidth of the victim by using P2P networks to store agent attack data before the attack process [39].  
Gao et al. [16] suggested a new approach that detects a DRDoS attack. When many packets appear 
frequently in shortened time and these packets consist only IP header without TCP or UDP header portion, as 
a result, that will lead to appear huge quantities of UDP packets with major volume. The amplification used 
in the DRDoS attack produces a gap between the size of the response to the request to be greater than the 
normal response size. The packet amplification factor in the DRDoS attack is larger than the bandwidth 
amplification factor based on the gross number of all sent packets to the destination at the period.  
This behavior leads to difficulty in discovering the attack based on the total UDP packet volume. 
One protocol used to launch the DRDoS attack means that only one port is used to perform the attack and all 
packets pass through this port, thereby generating maximum traffic. This system consists of three parts: 
implementation, calculation of features, and detection. In each part, steps include collecting the data and 
focusing on the display of the packet states and the influx of the feature volume extract. Detection is based on 
a timer to decide whether an attack has occurred or not. 
Wei et al. [17] suggested an algorithm called rank correlation-based detection (RCD), which has two 
scenarios: one attacker and many reflectors. In both scenarios, one of the attackers falsifies requests to the 
inverter and randomly arranges the first scenario with a steady rate, e.g., leaving bandwidth and the second 
scenario with a depressed but changing rate. The alarm is switched on 10 seconds after the occurrence of the 
attack. to distinguish the proportion of packet rate of assaulting from the legal streams by using a threshold; 
it’s found that: We can distinguish the two correlation types with the wide domain of assault packet rate. The 
false negative and false positive can be fulfilled in low value. Once fishy streams are discovered, RCD begins 
to calculate the rank correlation between stream couples and produces a crucial warning depending on the 
preset sill.  
Huang et al. [29] suggested a new solution called “increasing expenses and weak authentication” 
(IEWA) to protect the NTP protocol, which is a UDP-based protocol, from DRDoS attacks. The new method 
focuses on several factors such as communication overhead, server storage costs, client storage costs, 
computation costs of the server, and computation costs of the client. The Monlist can be abused by the 
attacker in the NTP protocol when it is enabled. Moreover, it contains the IP addresses of the last 600 clients. 
The proposed method IEWA is a strategy that combines growing expenses and low authentication. 
The steady-state opportunity in the system when using the IEWA increases from 0.93 to 0.98. Two 
scenarios are assumed: First is that the number of client demands is not restricted, and second, we have 
restricted the number of client demands even though the client makes endless service demands that do not 
appear as a DoS attack. The IEWA strategy in this situation is proof against both DRDoS and DoS attacks. 
The traditional or classical techniques for attack detection may be ineffective sometimes especially 
with the network that has huge data because of the impact of large network traffic that floods important 
signals of assaults. Therefore, Jing et al [20] suggested a method that uses sketch techniques to detect 
amplification assaults. The authors plan a reversible sketch based on Chinese remainder theorem (CRT-RS), 
which has been used to immediately gather network traffic and thereafter observe the unforeseen differences 
in a one-to-one mapping among demand packets and reply packets to distinguish amplification assault traffic. 
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At each row in CRT-RS, when the occurrence of aberrant buckets is discovered, the addresses of the reply 
packets are counted and blacklisted as a malignant provenance. To check if the incoming source address was 
in the blacklist, we use the abloom filter, and then if the IP address exists, then traffic filtering is performed. 
This study mainly aims to detect an amplification attack to utilize CRT-RS by analyzing traffic behavior and 
reconstructing the aberrant IP addresses in a reverse manner. This approach is a good and effective solution 
for large network traffic. This simple method is not needed as a requirement for recording the complex 
features of traffic. The final results show that this method carefully detects amplification assaults. 
Lukaseder et al. [40] proposed a mechanism that works on classifying legal or illegal reply packets 
in DRDoS attacks. The packets receivable from the target host can be classified into four kinds: legal 
demands and replies and illegal demands and replies. The demand packets are isolated from the reply 
packets, which are based on UDP protocol. The malicious replies should be filtered because DRDoS attacks 
can only come from replies. The mitigation scheme of DRDoS analyzes and filters only these reply packets 
based on the analysis of the incoming replies to distinguish between legal and illegal replies. The replies are 
legal if and only if the destination host sends comparable demands in advance. For this purpose, modified 
NAT is applied when the attack occurs. NAT is activated and the origin IP address of the assault goal is a 
substitute through the alias IP address outside UDP-based demands. The second differentiator isolates the 
demands from the replies to be eligible for use NAT only for the outside demands not for outside replies.  
The pseudonym IP address has to be more complex to be guessing, so it's not comfortable potential 
for an attacker to shift their assault to the pseudonym IP address. However, the attacker can disclose the 
pseudonym IP address if the network traffic is monitored at the goal. For this reason, one can change the 
address in an orderly manner through a grace period.   
Deli et al. [41] suggested a fully automatic analysis tool. When measuring the amplification factor 
for several protocols, the researchers show that these protocols and servers are vulnerable according to their 
mechanism. The measurement and identification both rely on traffic information from specific ISP, and 
distinguishes the questionable traffic stream that has a particular style, such as height amplification factors. 
The model suggested by the authors consists of three parts: attacker, amplifier, and victim. Each part 
complements the others to complete the work of this model. The first part (attacker) wants to tuck the 
maximum bandwidth of the prey by reflecting a massive volume of amplified traffic by using the second part. 
Then, in the second part, some protocols attract the attacker because of their vulnerable points that build-up 
in the server, and most of these protocols are based on UDP in transmissions. When a server replies to the 
request from the client, sometimes the size of the reply packet is larger than the request size and appears to be 
an abnormal reply. This feature can be exploited when spoofing  IP address is potential from the first part 
side. When the first part sends the data, the third part is not the immediate goal. However, the prey undergoes 
overcrowding in traffic, which is sent from the second part. 
Mittal [42] focuses on the NTP protocol and how to protect this protocol from DRDoS attacks. To 
detect and mitigate the DRDoS attacks, the suggested model uses a graphical processing unit (GPU) with the 
prey machine called hybrid computing system. The results showed that the hybrid (CPU–GPU) computing 
machine is better than the simple machine (CPU only) and more effective in amplification response. When 
this model was tested, five systems were employed: attacker, compromised, reflector (NTP server), prey 
machine, and legal user. The attacker uses the Metasploit tool to establish a link with the weak machines after 
searching for the weak points in the system. When this link is found, the connection is obtained. The attacker 
starts posting demands to synchronize with the reflector by sending  UDP demand packets to the NTP server 
through IP spoofing. The attacker uses Bit-Twist tool to capture the aforementioned packets and modifies the 
origin IP address. The Monlist contains the last 600 hosts that link to the NTP server. This leads to the 
creation of 600 modified packages, which are sent to NTP through the compromised system through Monlist 
rule by Bit-Twist tool help. Huge traffic floods the NTP server by using the Bit-Twist tool, which generates a 
new Monlist content that is posted with details to the prey linked to the NTP server. Three main influential 
factors (CPU, main memory, and bandwidth) are used to compare the hybrid and normal systems before and 
after the attacks. Our hybrid machine system shows that the CPU consumption decreases and response is 
better during the DRDoS attack when using the system rather than a normal machine. Also, memory in the 
hybrid machine is less than what is needed in the normal machine. However, our hybrid machine cannot 
reduce the effectiveness of the DRDoS attack on the bandwidth. During the occurrence of the attack, the 
legal users were unable to use services as a result of the large traffic that saturates the bandwidth. 
Nevertheless, the hybrid machine in the experiment is better than the normal machine. The attacks in the past 
years have shown a new mechanism and numerous effects on the victim’s side. A critical aspect is the 
reflection/amplification assault, which has many types, including store and forward DRDoS (SF-DRDoS) 
based on the idea of store and flood at peer-to-peer networks. These attacks demonstrate a large amplification 
factor.  
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Fraiwan et al. [39] proposed a new method to detect and mitigate these types of attacks based on 
crawling and filtering. The new defense strategy is based on distinguishing potential reflector nodes by 
simulating the attackers’ demeanor besides foiling their actions. It is possible to get information concerning 
potential reflector nodes through crawling Kad in every limited period time. In this condition, a Bloom filter 
is used to discover anomalous traffic at this moment with large filenames. Then, after the filtering is 
completed to exclude the onslaught packets, the crawling techniques that exist in the literature can be 
classified into two classes: iterative and recursive. Often, the iterative crawling fails to find some nodes and 
crawls to the identical nodes. This situation leads to wasted bandwidth and increment ID space. Two critical 
metrics are used in the crawling process evaluation: accuracy of the crawler and traffic cost-effectiveness 
(TCE). Based on the aforementioned metrics, the recursive crawling is best in detecting potentially large 
numbers of nodes than the iterative crawling with high TCE value. When one of the specific inputs is equal 
to 0, the filter does not filter the nodes and allows packets to push through. When they are all 1, the node is 
presumably inserted into the filter without any false positives. 
Chen et al. [43] have employed two modern techniques, namely, SDN technique and ML algorithm, 
to produce and design a new system that is able to detect and prevent a DRDoS package automatically. The 
proposed system consists of two main components: detection agent and open networking operating system 
(ONOS). The first component, i.e., the detection agent, consists of two parts: the first part is responsible for 
observing the network by using netmate tool, and the second part is created through a machine learning 
algorithm called a classifier. The second main component, which is the ONOS, works in a manner similar to 
the SDN controller. It provides an OpenFlow protocol and allows various RESTful APIs to determine 
specific vectors in a limited time interval. Then, the result is used to teach a prototype by ML algorithms to 
classification by using a netmate tool. The next step is training the ML model. In training, both regular and 
malignant flows of DNS requests and responses are required. During the reflection attack, the increase of the 
stream to the victim occurs by posting a huge amount of demands in a short time. This operation to produce 
huge response packets to the reflect, continuously the attacker asking for special domain names plus several 
fixed orders. The standard deviation from the attackers’ side in packet size appears to be zero. The pattern of 
traffic is dissimilar to that of normal ones. As the average volume of response packets is larger than regular 
and the standard deviation is near zero ... so by chosen, each feature is linked to backward packets. Only the 
chosen packets are checked, and this feature decreases the load on the detection agent. 
Meitei et al. [44] employed two important techniques: machine learning (ML) algorithms and 
attribute selection algorithms. The first part is the ML algorithms, which uses four supervised ML 
algorithms: decision tree, multilayer perceptron, naïve Bayes, and SVM. Furthermore, they used three 
attribute selection algorithms: information gain (IG), gain ratio (GR), and chi-square, which are applied to the 
chosen parameters. The main task of this study is to analyze the DNS queries.  
Three important steps taken to complete the suggested scheme are the method of how to select 
parameters, how to train and test ML algorithms, and the way of parameter diminution. chosen eight elected 
statistical feature dataset i.e. arrival time of the packet, occurrence of IP per unit time, answer and authority 
and additional of resource records, and minimum and maximum and an average of packet size. The next step 
is training and testing by using the classification and clustering algorithm for the selected features by 
selecting the same number of IP addresses for both normal and attack DNS queries. By using the feature 
selection algorithms IG, GR, and chi-square to diminish repetitive parameters and drop unnecessary features, 
both operations minimize computational time and exhibit high detection accuracy.   
To detect DNS amplification attacks, Cai et al. [45] focus on three features that affect the detection 
method according to their vision. These features are used in the DNS server to discriminate the normal a 
certain time from that abnormal. These features are recurrence of DNS demands, rate of amplified data traffic 
at a certain time (reply traffic/demand traffic), and amount of grown packet in a certain period. The third 
feature, which is the ratio of the number of the response packets to that of demand packets in one unit time, 
not only increases the accuracy of detection however it be easier to determine real-time data. A K-means 
machine-learning algorithm is used to distinguish between the normal and abnormal packets by classifying 
them into abnormal and normal clusters, after classifying the packets into clusters through K-means 
algorithm from the detection model and determining the reference points. The main drawback of the study 
may be the method of determining the weight per feature and placing the same weight on the three features. 
Böttger et al. [24] suggested a model for detection amplification attacks; this model relies on 
observing and distinguishing traffic. When a client wants to connect to the server, a PairFlow is formed. 
Many UDP flows are also produced by aggregating those collections of flows. The PairFlow appears and 
contains the client IP, IP and port of the server, payload dispatch to the server, payload dispatch to the client, 
and recording period interval for the PairFlow to determine average rates. In the test stage, we select a certain 
time, i.e.,10 minutes for the PairFlow, as active/inactive in that time interval.  
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Additional criteria are used to detect amplification attacks, i.e., request and response packet size 
similarity, request and response payload, similarity, unsolicited messages, and IP spoofing. The attacker 
sometimes attempts to avoid detection, i.e., low traffic generates a low attack factor less than our detection 
threshold. If payload entropy and demand packet lengths can be adapted, then the mass of attack traffic need 
not be diminished. Minimizing the detection threshold is possible to detect the low attack factor but at the 
same time increases the false positive alarm. 
Liu et al. [46] one of the main reasons for increasing the reflection attacks on SSDP is the 
proliferation of IoT devices. Previously many approaches were suggested to detect and mitigate the 
Reflection attacks on SSDP but this method is more effective and modernity because it employs the bots as 
defense methods and this approach is called a multi-location defence scheme (MLDS). Three principal 
features that distinguish it from other approaches are:  the mechanism of the MLDS begins from assault 
source to prey via assaulting link, also not based on detection of assaults, and the main and novelty key is to 
utilized bot as defenders. The deployment of various protection strategies to multiple locations from the 
above study will make the defence work efficiently in the entire attack link, from the source initiating the 
attack to the victim. This is why we are developing the MLDS. 
Kim et al. [47] proposed a method to prevent the DNS amplification attacks. by utilizing the history 
queries of DNS based on SDN they proposed a method to prevent the DNS amplification attacks. This 
technique proactively and reactively acts to reduce the effects of these attacks on native DNS servers. there 
are two kinds of DNS packets are A and ANY, the A for normal packets, and ANY for the attacker packets. 
The proposed mechanism relies on a one-to-one technique, i.e., for each response, a corresponding request 
exists. The orphan pairs are classified as suspicious immediately, thereby enabling the protection of the local 
DNS servers. it contains two principal components are switch and SDN controller. Understanding the 
behavior of any attack is important to produce the perfect technique to detect or mitigate from that type of 
attack. 
Thus, Huistra [48] focuses on the fingerprints of the attack, and because the attacks that are 
attacking the DNS are the most famous types of DRDoS attack, this work focuses on DNS attacks and how to 
distinguish and analyze the behavior of the DNS attacks. When designing a detection scheme for DNS 
reflection attack, this work needs much information to obtain excellent results. Some of the information 
include the IP address of both the host and the server, the request and reply time of DNS, the size DNS 
request and its response, and source, destination port for DNS query. The scenario of this approach depends 
on the consistent size of both the request and response. When the size of the request and response is 
inconsistent, the attacker exploits this feature. Furthermore, the attacker can employ a small or large number 
of DNS servers for the attack. In the NetFlow scenario, some information is lost, i.e., the size of every packet 
and individual capture time because of the aggregation method. This study does not include detection of 
attacks that use various sizes of requests. 
El Houda et al. [49] the suggested model called WisdomSDN that used to detect and mitigate the 
DNS amplification attacks.the restricted and monitoring on DNS  requests/responses by using a one-to-one 
technique to recognize the illegitimate DND demands and replies. the results show that the WisdomSDN 
achieves a high rate of detection and a low rate of false-positive. Dodia and Zhauniarovich [50] this method 
focus on filtering  garbage traffic to prevent upcoming amplification demands from accessing amplifiers 
inside the  provider network, protecting vulnerable services from abuse. this prototype will track spoofed 
traffic and filter it out at the ISP network's edge. This eliminates garbage traffic caused by network 
amplifiers, saving ISPs and their customers time and money. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
This study focused on cybersecurity because the number of internet users is growing dramatically 
and the various devices connected to the internet are the main challenge in the field of security. When it is 
denial legitimate user from the services that are provided. The DoS attack is a popular form of these 
challenges. The more effective version is the distributed DoS attack, but attackers improve the DDoS attacks 
to produce robust attacks with devastating effects on the victim’s side. This attack is called the DRDoS 
attacks, which has been the focus of network security research in previous years because of the volume of 
attacks and their effects. This type of attacks prefers the UDP protocols. Thus, most of the papers focused on 
the services that rely on UDP protocols. We compared the papers in terms of method used and the feature 
selection as well detection performance. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to classify this 
type of attack based on transport protocols, such as DRDoS attacks based on TCP protocol and DRDoS 
attacks based on UDP protocol. We aim to focus on a special protocol in the future, which is the most 
popular among other protocols that have been and will continue to be the target of DRDoS attacks. 
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Table 2. DRDoS research papers that based on UDP protocol (Continue) 
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